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An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American 
Foreign Policy. By Betty Glad. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-
0801448157.  
 
 In her book An Outsider in the White House, Betty Glad opens with the question, “What 
happens when an outsider with lofty moral and political goals and little experience or education 
in foreign policy takes over the U.S. presidency?” (1). President Jimmy Carter’s solution, she 
responds, was to lean on his staff in order to formulate and execute foreign policy.  As a result, 
his advisors exercised undue influence over international affairs and ultimately hijacked his 
original global policy.  In addition, Glad describes the internal rivalries that existed within the 
Carter administration’s foreign policy team, specifically focusing on the differences between 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.  Glad 
concludes that Brzezinski’s ultimate victory in this power struggle further caused the 
administration’s diplomatic agenda to shift over the course of Carter’s four years in office.  
 Glad elaborates upon this argument throughout the book’s six parts. The first third of the 
monograph, for instance, shows Carter’s initial policy goals and Brzezinski’s moves to 
consolidate power over his rivals within the administration, through the midterm election cycle 
in 1978.  Indeed, Carter allowed Brzezinski extensive authority over foreign affairs before the 
administration entered office.  Most of this power was granted through review of Presidential 
Review Memoranda and other reports (30-1).  Additionally, the organizational structure in place 
ensured that Brzezinski had the greatest access to Carter.  Since Carter lacked a chief of staff for 
the first three years of his term (9), Brzezinski was able to reach the president whenever he 
pleased without interference from another individual, thus acquiring an opportunity to exploit 
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the system and Carter’s lack of foreign policy experience.  Finally, the section describes 
Carter’s broad foreign policy objectives.  In Carter’s first days in the Oval Office, he wanted to 
press human rights as an international issue and oversee substantial nuclear arms reduction (54).  
Glad notes, however, that Carter abandoned these goals shortly into his term, due in part to 
Brzezinski’s influence.  
The third and fourth parts of Glad’s book trace the failed efforts of Vance and others in 
the administration to exert influence over policymaking.  The third section, for instance, begins 
with Brzezinski’s push for greater relations with China.  Although Vance disagreed and 
believed that increased diplomacy with China might harm future talks with the Soviet Union 
(120), the persistent Brzezinski was able to persuade Carter, due  “not only [to] institutional and 
political considerations but psychological factors as well” (138).  Brzezinski was successful 
over his counterparts because he made Carter feel as though he were acting “tough” (139), and 
Glad notes that Brzezinski repetitively fell back to this strategy when trying to influence Carter.  
In her view, Brzezinski continued to outmaneuver his internal rivals because of the 
organizational structure in place and Brzezinski’s ability to say what the President wanted to 
hear.  
These two parts are perhaps the most intriguing portion of the work.  Brzezinski entered 
1979 as Carter’s primary foreign policy advisor, despite his minor role in Carter’s two “very 
real successes [Panama Canal and Camp David] (3).  Indeed, Carter’s greatest foreign policy 
success, the Camp David Accords, came when he personally took the lead.  In contrast, the 
many issues on which Brzezinski took the initiative did not yield the same successes as those 
where Carter led and utilized his entire administration.  Nonetheless, the president still 
abandoned the organizational structure that brought him success, in favor of a Brzezinski-
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centric structure that had no major successes to its credit.  The reader must wonder whether 
Carter recognized what had led to success at Camp David and whether by late 1978, Carter 
understood how to run the White House. 
 The final two parts discuss Brzezinski’s absolute leverage over foreign policy during the 
final years of the Carter presidency.  In July 1980, Carter, who once supported nuclear 
reduction, signed Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) which affirmed the administration’s belief 
that a strong nuclear program was necessary for American security needs (219).  PD 59 was 
direct evidence that the assertive Brzezinski foreign policy was now the policy of the entire 
administration.  With Brzezinski at the helm, Carter also dropped the human rights stance with 
which he entered office, choosing to ignore human rights violators for the sake of geopolitical 
considerations.  Consequently, the Carter administration that entered office championing human 
rights found itself voting in the United Nations to allow Pol Pot’s regime to continue its 
representation of Cambodia in the organization (238).   
 This final part demonstrates a paradox within Carter’s foreign policy goals.  Carter 
wanted others to view him as strong and tough in foreign politics.  Brzezinski, however, was 
able to exploit Carter’s desires and become more powerful than his boss in the realm of foreign 
policy.  Carter’s hopes to be perceived as tough to external powers, then, actually weakened him 
within his own administration.  This paradox led to many of the administration’s foreign policy 
short-comings, and Brzezinski’s ability to outmaneuver Carter ultimately helped to seal the 
latter’s presidential legacy.  Through Glad’s analyses, though, the reader is given the chance to 
formulate his or her own opinions on Carter’s time in office.  On one hand, the reader can feel 
sympathy for Carter and argue that Carter was exploited by Brzezinski.  The reader could also 
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place the blame directly on Carter for not being a competent executive and argue that Carter 
should have recognized Brzezinski’s position and not allowed him to gain so much influence.   
Regardless of the reader’s opinion, Glad still establishes that there was a stark contrast 
between how Carter wanted to be perceived in the international community and how he was 
within his own administration.  
 Glad’s work is an in-depth account of the internal workings of Jimmy Carter’s foreign 
policy staff that successfully illustrates how  Carter’s international objectives changed as a 
result of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s ability to exploit  Carter’s inexperience and hijack his 
diplomatic agenda.  The book further makes the reader question whether Carter was at fault for 
Brzezinski’s ability to change the administration’s foreign policy agenda or if Carter was a 
victim within his own administration to an over-ambitious National Security Advisor.  The 
reader’s answer to this critical question provides a frame for their view of Jimmy Carter’s time 
in office. 
 
Andrew K. Mengle 
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